Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam (the Abodes of War and Peace)

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Traditionally, Islamic law has understood the world as divided into a number of distinct domains based upon the relationship of the ruling parties to Islam and the Islamic state, or Caliphate. Whether or not these territories have always existed or continue to exist, virtually all Islamic scholars until today agree on the existence, at least conceptually, of such a place as the Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Kufr (lit. "Abode of War", or "Infidelity") and Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Salam, or Dar al-Tawhid (lit. "Abode of Submission", or "Peace", or "Unity"). More controversial throughout history and experiencing varying levels of intellectual assent and much definitional debate, although growing in popularity in recent times, has been the tertiary domain of Dar al-Sulh, Dar al-Ahd, or Dar al-Amn (lit. "Abode of Treaty", "Truce", or "Safety"). The purpose of these distinctions is to delineate the imperial policy of the Islamic state. Most simplistically, the regions controlled by or subservient to the Islamic state have been considered as constituting the Dar al-Islam and those not as constituting the Dar al-Harb. Scholars have differed as to whether regions with which the Islamic state has a treaty ought to be considered part of the Dar al-Harb or the tertiary category of Dar al-Sulh. Scholars have also differed as to whether, if such a place as the Dar al-Sulh exists, it can be considered permanent. This is because most classical scholars agreed that the Islamic state, destined to conquer the entire world, was not permitted by God to have everlasting treaties with non-subservient political or military entities, with many agreeing on a 10-year maximum-limit on peaceful relations with any such entity. The questions of whether or not such treaties, albeit temporary, could be again and again renewed and to whether or not multiple independent Islamic states, as have often existed throughout history and as exist today, could together constitute the Dar al-Islam as opposed to a single unified state has complexified the debate.

In addition to imperial implications, classical Islamic legal scholars agreed that the law by which individual Muslims have to live in these different territories varies. The traditionally popular perspective was that all non-Muslim residents in the Dar al-Harb were enemies of God and thus could be stolen from, charged interest (which was otherwise prohibited), enslaved, or even killed. The rationale behind these rulings was that, as enemies of God destined to be conquered by the Islamic state, these non-Muslims themselves and their property were in fact booty earmarked for the Muslim ummah. However, these perspectives have fallen out of favor in recent times, particularly in the West among diasporic Muslim communities.



Dar al-Harb (دار الحرب "house of war"; also referred to as dar al-Garb "house of the West" in later Ottoman sources) is an Islamic legal term used for regions which are not under Islamic rule.

According to The New Encyclopedia of Islam, the Dar al-Harb (lit. the "abode of war") is:

the territories where Islam does not prevail. During colonial rule in India, the 'uluma decided that as long as the laws of Islam were not prohibited, or as long as the peculiar institution of Islam existed, the country could be considered to lie within dar al-islam ("abode of Islam"). Symbolically, the dar al-harb is the domain, even in an individual's life, where there is a struggle against or opposition to, the Will of God.
Glasse, Cyril. (2002). The New Encyclopedia of Islam: Revised Edition of the Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. (p. 111). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

In context, jihad is the divine institution of warfare destined to extend Islam into the Dar al-Harb by transforming it into part of the Dar al-Islam.[1]

History and use of Dar al-Harb

According to Professor Gamal M. Badr, Adjunct Professor of Islamic law at New York University, in his article titled "A Survey of Islamic International Law", during the Islamic age of expansion jurists elaborated the theory that the rest of the world outside the domain of Islam was collectively Dar al-Harb, and the normal relationship between it and the Muslim state was considered to be war. Any truces could not exceed a duration of ten years (a precedent set during Muhammad's lifetime).[2]

During the age of expansion, the rationale for waging war against non-Muslims centered around the legal thought that it was justified by the mere fact of their disbelief.[3] After over a century of rapid expansion, Islamic leaders, political and intellectual, came to the realization that carrying Islam to the four corners of the world was unattainable.[2] What was once a world divided exclusively into a Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb became a more complicated world divided into a Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Sulh ("territory of treaty"), and Dar al-Harb. The Dar al-Sulh was comprised of states that did not recognize Islamic rule over them but were not hostile towards Muslim states and made friendly treaties with them.[3]

According to Tariq Ramadan, a prominent Muslim reformer, academic, and theologian:

The doctrinal position of the salafi literalist and their groups in the West, which are in constant communication with scholars based primarily in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, or Syria (mostly through former students of their respective educational institutions), refuses any kind of involvement in a space that is considered non-Islamic. The concepts of dar al-kufr and dar al-harb36 are still operational and continue to explain the relationship of the salafis with the social environment, which is characterized primarily by isolation and by a literally applied religious practice protected from Western cultural influences.[4]
[Political literalist Salafism] is trenchant, politicized, radical, and opposed to any idea of involvement or collaboration with Western societies, which is seen as akin to open treason. The Hizb al-Tahrir and Al-Muhajirun movements are the best known in Europe, and they call for jihad and opposition to the West (always considered as dar al-harb, the realm of war) by all means.[5]

The following excerpt is from the full-text indictment of the "Detroit Five", a Middle Eastern sleeper cell that was planning a terror attack on Disneyland:

Salafists seek to reform Islam by specifically emulating the first generation of Muslims since, according to these Salafists, later generations of Muslims have been corrupted by several centuries of religious practices and Western influences introduced by errant Muslims. Salafists reject any behavior that was not specifically supported or enjoined by the Prophet Mohammed. In almost every Sunni Muslim country, the Salafists have spawned radical fundamentalist-Islamic political movements, the goal of which is to compel the state to apply the Sharia. Many Salifists believe that the strict application of the Sharia is necessary to ensure that Muslims walk the true path of the Prophet. These radical fundamentalist-Islamic groups see the world divided in two spheres; that is, Dar-al-Islam (House of Islam or Islamic Zone), where peace reigns (Sallam), and the Dar-al-Harb (House of War or War Zone), which prevents a true Islamic state. The latter is viewed by these radical fundamentalist-Islamic groups to include all "infidel" areas that must ultimately be conquered. Global jihad is the constant effort to achieve this goal. The global jihad against Dar-al-Harb is not exclusively directed towards the outside world, but also against perceived internal threats, such as any non-Muslim presence in Dar-al-Islam.[6]

Tariq Ramadan, by contrast, argues that the concept of Dar al-Harb is not found in the Qur'an or Sunnah, but rather it was the ulama who began to classify and define the various areas in and around the places which they lived.[7] He asserts that it was a human attempt, at a moment in history, to describe the world and to provide the Muslim community with a geopolitical scheme that seemed appropriate to the reality of the time.[8] He explains that some ulama use the Shafi'i concept of Dar al-Ahd ("abode of treaty") or Dar al-Amn ("abode of safety") when discussing the situation of Muslims in the West.[9]

Several popular Islamic authorities use the term Dar al-Harb. Islam Q&A defines it as "every place in which the rule of kufr prevails" and explains that it is obligatory for Muslims to migrate from the Dar al-Harb to Muslim lands (also known as a Hijrah) if they are unable to practice their religion openly.[10] According to Sheikh `Atiyyah Saqr, a former head of al-Azhar Fatwa Committee, in a fatwa on IslamOnline, the late Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahrah mentioned two main scholarly opinions concerning the definitions of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Sheikh Abu Zahrah then opts for Imam Abu Hanifah’s opinion that the question revolves around the matter of security. That is if a Muslim is safe and secure in the place he lives, then the place is Dar al-Islam, and if not, then it is Dar al-Harb. He also said that this opinion conforms well to the Islamic principles of war, described as a defense strategy.[11]

Khilafah.com provides a thorough definition but states near the end of its article that "it is clear that the whole world is Dar al-Kufr as no country including every single Muslim country implements Islam. We see the laws of Allah abandoned as if they were worth nothing, the Sunnah of the Prophet betrayed and the example of the Sahaba ignored by the rulers of our countries."

According to Shariah terminology, Dar al-Islam is defined as the land which is governed by the laws of Islam and whose security (Aman) is maintained by the security of Islam, i.e. by the authority and protection of Muslims inside and outside the land, even if the majority of its inhabitants are non-Muslims.

Dar al-Kufr is the land which is governed by the laws of Kufr, and whose security is not maintained by the security (Aman) of Islam, i.e. by other than the authority and security of Muslims, even if the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims.

So what matters in determining whether the land is Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr is neither the land itself nor its inhabitants, rather it is the laws and the security. So if its laws are Islamic and its security is maintained by Muslims then it is Dar al-Islam. When its laws are the laws of Kufr (disbelief) and its security is not maintained by Muslims then it is Dar al-Kufr. The term Dar al-Harb (land of war) is synonymous with Dar al-Kufr as in origin the aim of Islam is to spread to all lands until the Islamic state encompasses the whole globe. However there is a difference between those nations which are considered as Dar al-Harb Fi’lan (actual land of war) like the state of Israel which occupies Islamic land and Dar al-Harb Hukman (potential land of war) which include other states which are not occupying Islamic land or engaged with a direct war against our lands. These definitions have been derived from the Islamic evidences and discussed by the Ulema (scholars) in history.[12]

In contrast with Muhammad's own implementation of jihad as found in Islamic scriptures as a doctrine of violent warfare, the Khilafah.com article concludes with the following statement:

The Ummah has no Imam (Khalifah) who rules by what is contained in the Quran and Sunnah, who acts as a shield to protect us and whose duty it would be to protect the Muslims of Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya and countless other places where the Muslim blood flows. Therefore it is paramount for us to work to re-establish Dar al-Islam, the Islamic Khilafah state through emulating the non-violent methodology of the Prophet (saw) in how he transferred Dar al-Kufr to Dar al-Islam and in the pursuit of this it is inevitable that we will be tried and tested.

The definition of harbi, or "agent of war"

A harbi, or "agent of war" was traditionally defined as any non-Muslim living in an area not subject to Islam and thus considered part of the Dar al-Harb. According to traditional Islamic jurists, the harbi has no rights: his blood and his property are licit to any Muslim.[13] This classical position is reflected in the statements of those many modern Islamist movements, including Al-Qaeda:

If by religious law it is permitted to punish a Muslim [for the crime he committed] - it is all the more permitted to punish a Harbi infidel [i.e. he who belongs to Dar Al-Harb 'the domain of disbelief'] in the same way he treated the Muslim.[14]
Al-Qa'ida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith, 2002

In Islamic writings


The Reliance of the Traveller, the traditional Shafi'i manual of Islamic law, defines the Dar al-Harb as "enemy lands" and provides Muslims with instructions and rules regarding such territory. For example, it explains that based on the Prophet's words: "There is no usury (riba) between the Muslim and the hostile non-Muslim in enemy lands (dar al-harb)," it is thus permissible (according to Abu Hanifa and Muhammad) for Muslims to take interest from non-Muslims in enemy lands, so long as it is not done through deception, because their property is lawful to Muslims in their own lands.[15] According to this manual of fiqh, Muslim authorities whose land borders enemy territory (Dar al-Harb) are obligated to undertake jihad against enemies, dividing the spoils of battle among combatants, and setting aside a fifth (the "khums") for deserving recipients.[16]


The following is an excerpt from an essay published in September 2001, titled “The Truth of the New Crusader War," by an author under the name “The Crusader Vanquisher Salah Al-Din":

First of all, we must clarify an important issue, and this is whether America is a country of war [Bilad Harb] or a country with which we have an agreement [Bilad Ahd]… It is agreed that it is a country of war, and it is permitted for Muslims to strike a country of war with all [kinds] of blows, because the blood, money, and honor of its residents are permitted. This is what the Messenger of Allah did with the Muharibeen [those from Dar Al-Harb, i.e. from territory not yet under Islamic rule that must be conquered ]: He abducted them like he did with the Banu 'Uqail; he plundered their merchant caravans as he did with the Quraysh; he assassinated their leaders as he did with Ka'ab Ibn Al-Ashraf and Salamah bin Abi Al-Huqaiq; he burned their land as he did with Banu Al-Nadhir; he destroyed their fortifications as he did in Taif, and other things.

Perhaps someone will say that if those who died [on September 11, 2001] are innocent women, elderly, and children, who must not be harmed even if they belong to a group from Dar Al-Harb, then how are these operations permitted by religious law?

We say [in response] that the sanctity of the blood of women, children, and the elderly [from among the people of Dar Al-Harb] is not absolute. Moreover, there are certain cases in which it is permitted to kill them when they [belong] to the people of Dar Al-Harb…

The first case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels [that is, children, women, and the elderly] in order to repay in kind. If the infidels target Muslim women, children, and elderly, then it is permitted for Muslims to repay them in kind and kill [their women, children and elderly] as they killed. This is because of the word of Allah the Supreme, 'Anyone who attacks you, attack him as he attacked you,' and also because of other evidence.

The second case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels in the event that they [the Muslims] attack them and cannot differentiate between those with immunity and the warriors or fortifications and, accordingly, they are permitted to kill them as a result [of inability to distinguish] and not with premeditation. This is because of what the Messenger said when asked about the offspring of the infidels [whom Muslims attacked] in an ambush and [during it] harmed their women and their children and said: 'They [the children] are of them [the warriors].' This proves that it is permissible to kill women and children because of [the deeds of] their fathers when it is not possible to distinguish between them [and the infidel warriors]…

The third case: It is permissible for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels if they are aiding the fighting in deed, word, opinion, or any other way. This is because of the Prophet's order to kill Duraid ibn Al-Simma, who was 120 years old and went with the Hawazin tribe [to fight against the Muslims] to give them counsel.

The fourth case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels when there is a need to burn the fortifications or the fields of the enemy in order to weaken his strength, to breach the ramparts, or to topple the country, even if the inviolable ones die as a result, such as the Prophet did in the case of Banu Al-Nadhir.

The fifth case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels if they need to use heavy weapons that cannot differentiate between those who are inviolable and the warriors, as the Prophet did at Taif.

The sixth case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels if the enemy uses women and children as a human shield and it is not possible to kill the warriors except by killing this shield. In such a case it is permitted to kill them all.

The seventh case: It is permitted for Muslims to kill inviolable infidels if the latter had an agreement with the Muslims and broke the agreement, and the imam had to kill the inviolable ones to make an example of them, like the Prophet did with Banu Qurayza.[17]

Islamic scholars and leaders

"The term 'civilians' does not exist in Islamic religious law. Dr. Karmi is sitting here, and I am sitting here, and I'm familiar with religious law. There is no such term as 'civilians' in the modern Western sense. People are either of Dar Al-Harb or not [...] If Al-Qa'ida indeed carried out this act [the London Bombings], it is a great victory for it. It rubbed the noses of the world's eight most powerful countries in the mud. This victory is a blow to the economy..."[18]
Dr. Hani Al-Siba'i, the director of the Al-Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies, 2005

The United States

The following fatwa (translated from the Arabic), was posted on the Al-Muhajiroun website in Arabic, as well as in an English version. It was signed, in the Arabic version, by Muhammad bin Abdallah Al-Musa'ari "Abu Majed", Secretary General of the Committee for the Protection of Legitimate Rights (in Saudi Arabia), and appeared under the emblem of the "Shari'a Court of the UK".

Question: What do the clerics say about Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other Islamic states allowing the U.S. to use their land, skies, ports, and military bases… while intensive preparations are underway for striking a blow at the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [i.e., the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan]…?

Answer: There is no doubt that America attacked, and is still attacking, the Muslims in every place and is carrying out massacres against them… It is the obligation of all Muslims to be in a state of war with it. The minimal obligation is a complete boycott, by means of avoiding diplomatic relations [with the U.S.]… The only ones who claim that 'diplomatic relations' [with the U.S.] are allowed are the clerics of the treacherous sultans (i.e. the rulers of Arab and Islamic countries), most of whom are donkeys bearing books, and some are like dogs: they have renounced the verses of Allah and become like dogs, that should be left to pant, as a place is already reserved for them, surely on the lowest level of the fires of Hell.

Those people… their situation is clear and there is no need for any doubt among any of the Muslims: They are Murtaddun [who were Muslims] who left Islam for heresy, if, at all, they were Muslims to begin with. They all are involved in the war against Islam and against Muslims and therefore the sentence of Murtadd Harbi [a Murtadd who should be fought] applies to them, as follows:

1) His blood becomes permissible, and he must be killed, as an obligatory punishment, without possibility of forgiveness, because he fights against Allah and his Prophet…

2) His marriage becomes invalid, as does his guardianship of his children and relatives…

3) His property is permissible … he will not be able to bequeath [it]…

4) He cannot be buried in a Muslim cemetery, because burying Muslims is an honor that is fitting only those who are Muslims, while they, male and female alike, are Murtaddun Harbiyun [who should be fought] and are not Muslims

5) He must be treated with animosity and hatred, exactly like the Harbi heretic is treated…

6) There is no distinction between a man and a woman with respect to this verse. The blood of a woman Murtadda Harbiya who fights is permissible, exactly like that of a male Harbi – even if her fighting is limited to singing: thus acted the Prophet against the fighting women of the Quraysh tribe. He permitted their blood and ordered them killed, although he generally prohibited killing women, and was even strict about this…[19]
Sheikh Bakri, Shari'a Court Judge in London, 2001

The following year Sheikh Bakri clarified his stance regarding Dar al-Harb, and in an article posted on the Al-Muhajiroun website he appeared to dissent from the Al-Qaeda perspective on jihad against those Muslims who do not put Shari'a into practice. He asserted that it was vital for Muslims to establish the Khilafah (Caliphate), and explained that jihad becomes a religious obligation only "when the enemy enters Muslim land, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Kosova or Kashmir." Bakri also argued that the Islamic concepts of Dar al-Islam versus Dar al-Harb no longer apply, meaning that the implicit obligation of Muslims to wage war on Dar al-Harb is no longer applicable. He argued that the concept of Dar al-Islam implies the existence of a Khilafah and that because there is no Khilafah nowadays (since the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924), there is no Dar al-Islam to carry out jihad aimed at imperial conquest and, consequently, no Dar al-Harb. Nevertheless, he continued, that when the kuffar (infidels) occupy Muslim land, then this occupied land becomes, to all practical purposes, Dar Al-Harb, and Muslims are required to fight for its liberation, "as in Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc." Such territories may also be defined, he suggested, as Dar al-Ghasab ("Abode of Usurpation"). Among such territories he listed Kashmir, Palestine and Northern Spain.[20]

Israel and Palestine

The martyrdom operations carried out by the Palestinian factions to resist the Zionist occupation are not in any way included in the framework of prohibited terrorism, even if the victims include some civilians [...] It has been determined by Islamic law that the blood and property of people of Dar Al-Harb [the Domain of Disbelief where the battle for the domination of Islam should be waged] is not protected.[21]
Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi, head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, 2003
The Zionists themselves do not differentiate between civilian and military personnel. They have set the entire people to military service. The civilian settler who occupies land in a state of war is a Harbi [that is, a non-Muslim living in an area regarded as 'Dar al-Harb,' the 'domain of war,' in which Islam does not dominate and must therefore be fought until Islam dominates it]. Besides, everyone in Israel, civilians and military personnel, bear arms. That is, they are 'Ahl al-Qital' [that is, those who deserve to be fought].[22]
Dr. Sheikh 'Ali Gum'a, Egyptian Mufti, 2003

When asked "Is it permitted to kill an Israeli traveling outside the borders of his land?" Sheikh 'Ali Gum'a replied:

Yes, it is permitted to kill him, because he is a Harbi and the Harbi spreads corruption throughout the face of the earth.

In 2008, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a decree to act against Israel, which he called "an infidel that should be warred against" (Kafer-e-Harbi) because of the "slaughter of the Palestinian Muslims" and the "plunder of Islamic lands". He stated: "All Palestinian fighters and all believers in the Islamic world must help the defenseless [Palestinian] women, children, and people in Gaza. Anyone who dies in this legitimate and sacred defense is a shahid [martyr]."[23]


On December 13, 2006, Islamist websites posted an hour-long video from the Caucasus, produced by Nuriddin Media, entitled "Dar al-Harb of Dagestan." The video, which contained many disturbing images, compelled MEMRI to edit out certain clips.

The video shows the Russian military, with its heavy weaponry, tanks, and planes bombing residential areas in Dagestan, and afterwards shows mujahideen firing heavy volleys at unseen targets. Then, to a song of "I am a terrorist, I strike fear in the enemies of the religion," the video shows mujahideen butchering one captive after another.

Later in the video, to the song "Where are those who want martyrdom?" and other songs of praise to martyrs, the video shows attacks on various civilian targets, including one on a bus and another on a group of wedding guests. In addition, two suicide attackers are shown reading out their last wills while driving a car en route to their mission.

Towards the end, the video shows images of the aftermath of the November 26, 2006, Russian raid on the mujahideen safe house near Dagestan - a raid in which Abu Hafs Al-Urduni, the commander of the foreign mujahideen in the Caucasus, was killed.[24]


American forces are guarding the presidential palace and foreign forces are in control of all the airports in the country. We think that it is not permissible under the shari'a to cooperate with the occupiers. It is also not permissible to join this government, because it is an agent government. Islam does not permit a Muslim to live in submission under infidels and aggressors. I think that Afghanistan is currently categorized as a 'Domain of War' [Dar Al-Harb]. All Afghans must remove the invading forces from their country. It is not possible for us to reach a dialogue now with those who supported the United States, because there will be no benefit in establishing contact and dialogue with them. They sided with the Russians in the past and received weapons and financial aid from them.[25]
Gulboddin Hekmatyar, Afghan Islamist leader of a militia that joined the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida
in a "holy war" against all international and peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, 2002

See also


  1. Glasse, Cyril. (2002). The New Encyclopedia of Islam: Revised Edition of the Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. (p.240). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
  2. 2.0 2.1 Janis, Mark W. & Evans, Caroline. (1999). Religion and International Law. (p. 95). The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International - Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
  3. 3.0 3.1 Janis, Mark W. & Evans, Caroline. (1999). Religion and International Law. (p. 96). The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International - Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
  4. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (pp. 25-26). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  5. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (p. 27). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  6. Full Text: Indictment of Detroit Five - Fox News, August 28, 2002
  7. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (p. 63). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  8. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (p. 69). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  9. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. (p. 72). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  10. Can Muslims settle in kaafir countries for the sake of a better life? - Islam Q&A, Fatwa No. 13363
  11. Atiyyah Saqr - Concept of Dar Al-Islam and Dar Al-Harb - IslamOnline, October 11, 2002
  12. Clarifying the meaning of Dar al-Kufr & Dar al-Islam - Khilafah, March 28, 2007
  13. Ye'or, Bat (Author). Kochan, Mariam & Littman, David (Translators). (2002). Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide. (p. 55). Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses.
  14. 'Why We Fight America': Al-Qa'ida Spokesman Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million Americans with Weapons of Mass Destruction - MEMRI: Special Dispatch, No. 388, June 12, 2002
  15. Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Masri & Nuh Ha Mim Keller. (1997). Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law Umdat Al-Salik. (p. 944, w43.2). Beltsville, MD: Amana Corporation.
  16. Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Masri & Nuh Ha Mim Keller. (1997). Reliance of the Traveller: The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law Umdat Al-Salik. (p. 647, o25.9). Beltsville, MD: Amana Corporation.
  17. Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder – MEMRI: Special Report – No. 25, January 27, 2004
  18. Director of London's Al-Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies Hani Sibai: There are No 'Civilians' in Islamic Law; The Bombing is a Great Victory for Al-Qa'ida, Which ‘Rubbed the Noses of the World's 8 Most Powerful Countries in the Mud' - MEMRI: Special Dispatch - No. 932, July 12, 2005
  19. Radical Islamist Profiles (2): Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad - London - MEMRI: Inquiry and Analysis - No. 73, October 25, 2001
  20. Islamist Leader in London: No Universal Jihad As Long As There is No Caliphate - MEMRI: Special Dispatch - No. 435, October 30, 2002
  21. Al-Qaradhawi Speaks In Favor of Suicide Operations at an Islamic Conference in Sweden - MEMRI: Special Dispatch - No. 542, July 24, 2003
  22. The New Egyptian Mufti - Dr. Sheikh 'Ali Gum'a: Opinions About Jihad, Supporting Suicide Bombings, and Forbidding Muslims in the U.S. Military From Fighting Other Muslims - MEMRI: Special Dispatch - No. 580, October 1, 2003
  23. Khamenei Decrees: Israel is Kafer-e-Harbi; Iranian Martyrdom Seekers Await Khameini's Orders; Iranian Student Organizations Threaten to Take Over Egyptian, Jordanian Diplomatic Representations - MEMRI: Special Dispatch - No. 2169, December 31, 2008
  24. Islamist Websites Monitor No. 38 - New Video from the Caucasus: "Dar Al-Harb of Dagestan" - MEMRI: Special Dispatch, No. 1403, December 31, 2006
  25. Interview With Afghan Islamist Leader On Jihad Against U.S. - MEMRI: Special Dispatch, No. 455, January 3, 2003