Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad: Difference between revisions

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'''''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad''''' is 2004 a book by academic [[Natana J. DeLong-Bas]], published by [[Oxford University Press]]. It is based "on a close study of the 14 volumes" of collected works of [[Wahhabism]]'s founder, [[Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab]] and has been called "the first extensive explication of the theology" of Wahhabism.<ref name="ybarra">{{cite news|url=https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB109027620568967848  |title=Books. In the Prophet's Name  [Review] |first=Michael J. |last=Ybarra|publisher=wsj.com|date=July 20, 2004}}</ref>

It is divided into sections: a brief religious biography and history of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, theology, Islamic law, women and Wahhabism, jihad and the evolution of Wahhabism.<ref name="B&N">{{cite web|title=Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Overview  [blurb]|url=http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/wahhabi-islam-natana-delong-bas/1117395956?ean=9780195333015|website=Barnes & Noble|quote=She focuses on four areas: theology, legal theory, proselytizing through education and jihad, and law on women.}}</ref>

''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad'' has been praised as a "monumental work ... lucid and carefully documented",<ref name=Long>{{cite journal|last1=Long|first1=David E|title=Saudi Arabia [review of ''Wahhabi Islam'' by Natana DeLong-Bas]|journal=Middle East Journal|date=2005|pages=316–19|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4330135|accessdate=2 July 2014}}</ref> "often fascinating", and presenting "a nuanced discussion of Wahhab's Quranic interpretation",<ref name=ybarra/> but also criticized as a "piece of scholarly trash"<ref name=Kearney/> and of "markedly inferior quality",<ref>{{cite journal|last= Schwartz |first=Stephen|title=[Review of] Wahhabi Islam: From Revival to Global Jihad by Natana J. Delong-Bas, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 359 pp. $35.|journal=Middle East Quarterly|date=Winter 2005 |url=http://www.meforum.org/1517/wahhabi-islam-from-revival-to-global-jihad}}</ref> and guilty of "special pleading".<ref name="ybarra"/>

 

 

 

 

 

She has also been criticized for depending  on the chronicles of supporters of ibn Abd al-Wahhab (primarily Ibn Bishr who is footnoted 45 times) for biographical information on ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Blogger Zubair Qamar compares it to using "[[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]]'s admirers" as a source for a biography on the Führer, and describing the admirer's  as "the 'most accurate'" sources "because they were among the closest in 'proximity' to him."<ref name=zubair>{{cite web|last1=Qamar|first1=Zubair|title=Critical Book Review: Wahhabi Islam (by Natana DeLong-Bas)|url=http://zubairqamar.com/2014/03/08/critical-book-review-wahhabi-islam-by-natana-delong-bas/|website=AGAINST "ISLAMIC" TERRORISM & ISLAMOPHOBIA|accessdate=13 August 2014|ref=March 8, 2014}}</ref>

In many dozens of places throughout her book DeLong-Bas contradicts "preconceived notions" and "negative stereotypes"<ref name="DLB2004: 364">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 364</ref><ref>index has a subheading for "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, negative stereotypes of"</ref> of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, contrasting them with his level of expertise -- "a well-trained and widely traveled scholar and jurist";<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref> his true beliefs, interests and approach—a devotion "to the concept of social justice”, concern with  "the protection of women and the poor";<ref name="DLB2004: 17">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 17</ref>  preference “to win converts through discussion, debate, and persuasion rather than force”,<ref name="DLB2004: 35">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 35</ref> call for  “fighting and military engagements” in the “struggle against unbelievers (''[[kuffar]]'') and hypocrites (''[[munafiq]]'')“ only as a “last resort” after “education and the call to Islam” had failed.<ref name="DLB2004: 33">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 33</ref>

His enmity towards non-Muslims has also been overstated, DeLong-Bas believes. He did not "divide the world" into Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis.<ref name="DLB2004: 83">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 83</ref> And while he did "at times" make "vehement denunciations" of them, he "never called for their destruction or death“.<ref name="DLB2004: 61">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 61</ref>  "Even in the case of jihad, if Muslims find themselves in need” Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated that “they may enter the territory of non-Muslims tribes that are friendly to them, [to take what they need] though only with the express permission of the imam.”

[[Muhammad ibn Saud]] did not follow the principles of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in his conquests, but IAW did not “actively" support or promote the conquests. He “merely `acceded` to” them, showing his lack of support by leaving the company of ibn Saud to devote himself “to spiritual matters and prayer.”<ref name="DLB2004: 35"/>  When Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did declare ''jihad'' against opponents, it was because they started it and justified their "military actions by accusing the Wahhabis of ignorance, sorcery and lies". Even then, IAW's jihad was "defensive" and "limited in scope", only attacking "those who had either attacked or insulted his followers directly."<ref name="DLB2004: 38">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 38</ref>

Inversely, [[polytheism]] or [[idolatry]], (''[[Shirk (Islam)|shirk]]''), the opposite of monotheism,  is “the one unforgivable sin.”<ref name="DLB2004: 62">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 62</ref>  "Failure to uphold Tawhid" may lead not just to [[Jahannam|damnation]] in Afterlife, but to "collapse of the social order, evil, tyranny, corruption, oppression, injustice and degeneration" in the [[Dunya|temporal world]].<ref name="DLB2004: 18">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 18</ref>

<ref>(While a hadith does say that Muhammad plans to petition God on behalf of good Muslim monotheists on Judgment Day, the hadith does not say it is permissible to ''ask'' Muhammad for intercession. (p.70))</ref>  

<ref name="IAWKT: 30">[[#IAWKT|Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', 1398h]]: 30</ref><ref name="DLB2004: 63">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 63</ref> and worship accords "godlike status to created beings and objects.”<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>    Anyone who requests intercession or who believes "in the power of requesting for intercession "must be  fought until they adhere to monotheism".<ref name="DLB2004: 63"/>

Also forbidden is “considering the writings or teachings of religious scholars, whether [[priest]]s, [[rabbi]]s, [[ulama]] (Islamic clerics) or jurists, to be as authoritative as God’s revelation.”<ref name="DLB2004: 62"/>  

The imitation of past juridical rulings, and traditions (''[[taqlid]]''), and placing human knowledge and science above the revelations of the [[Quran]] and [[hadith]]s.<ref name="DLB2004: 62"/>

Use of [[amulet]]s, charms or [[talisman]]s to cure disease, ward off the evil eye, or other problems, is “actually graver in nature than major sins”, and ignorance of its prohibition is “no excuse”. Wearers of talismans are to be rejected and condemned and their talismans removed immediately. Wearing an amulet or talisman so “as to be subject to its control” is grounds for “immediate death.”<ref name="DLB2004: 73">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 73</ref>  (The only exception to this prohibition is a talisman consisting of Quranic verses that are used to ward off jealousy or the sting of deadly animals.<ref name="DLB2004: 73"/>)

“Sorcery” – i.e. seeking to know the future through [[astrology]], blowing on knots, using particularly beautiful language,<ref name="DLB2004: 251">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 251</ref> and other means—is such a grave sin that it is punishable by “immediate death”.<ref name="DLB2004: 73"/>

Making “what appear to be harmless statements”—like attributing a good harvest to rainfall, or someone's wealth to the person who left them an inheritance—is shirk. This is because it is God and not rain or inheritance that provides any such blessings. Doing so can be a “reflection of continued shirk in the heart and mind.”<ref name="DLB2004: 76">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 76</ref> Likewise, phrases like `if only such and such had happened` and `If only so an so had done such and such` should be avoided.<ref name="DLB2004: 77">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 77</ref>  Joking or jesting about God, the Quran, or Muhammad is an “act of unbelief.”<ref name="DLB2004: 77"/>

Another common practice to avoid is expressing sorrow or giving a “negative response” to the death of a loved one or any other adversity,<ref name="DLB2004: 76"/>  These express disagreement with the will of God, and therefore contest tawhid.<ref name="DLB2004: 69"/>

It is important to note that “However much he denounced certain practices or beliefs, IAW never called for wholesale killing of people, not even apostates. ... he declared that it is perfectly acceptable, and even beneficial, to carry out business with anyone who is friendly to Muslims" even if they are non-Muslims.<ref name="DLB2004: 82"/> “Declarations and accusations of or ruling against apostasy" were "quite rare"  in his works and he "further cautioned that evidence of apostasy must be very clear" before seizing their property and killing them.<ref name="DLB2004: 82"/>

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab believed "that direct knowledge of the Quran and hadith should be the foundation for all other knowledge, ..."<ref name="DLB2004: 196">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 196</ref>  Placing "human knowledge and science" above "the revelations of the Quran and hadith" is a sin because it assigns "power and sovereignty, which are God's alone, to someone or something other than God."<ref name="DLB2004: 62"/>

"major" or "grave" sins include:

*Slaughtering an animal in any other name than God’s

*Unjustly altering the boundaries of personal land properties in order to achieve illegitimate advantage<ref name="DLB2004: 77"/>

*''Shirk''

*False accusations against chaste women<ref name="DLB2004: 77"/>

*''Shirk'',  

*Disobedience to one’s parents, and false testimony. and finally  

*Lack of goodness or righteousness in the heart that spoils the entire body.”<ref name="DLB2004: 77"/>

*being dishonest toward or defrauding subjects;  

*hiding or veiling things from citizens;  

*showing favoritism in governing;  

*engaging in tyranny, oppression, or injustice;  

DeLong-Bas states that "although it is often asserted" that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was "adamantly opposed to Shiism", he only "denounced" some practices of theirs and "never specifically mentioned the Shia by name" except in one treatise where he "targeted only one particular extremist sect, the Rafidah".<ref name="DLB2004: 22">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 22</ref>{{#tag:ref|DeLong-Bas writes on page 22 that "Although it is often asserted that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was adamantly opposed to Shiism, he specifically targeted only one particular extremist sect, the Rafidah in one only treatise.<P> On page 84 she writes that "Historically the Hanbalis were in fact opposed to Shiism. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself found certain beliefs and practices of Shiis to violate the key doctrine of monotheism.|group=Note}}

*denying the legitimacy of the first three [[caliph]]s ([[Abu Bakr]], [[Umar]] and [[Uthman]]) as a violation of the hadith stating `my community will never agree in an error' (''[[Ijma]]''),

*the practice of according infallible status to those descendants of Muhammad who were imams,<ref name="DLB2004: 85">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 85</ref>  

According to the hadith—which  provides the basis for the Shi’i doctrine of the Imamate, and is embraced by Shia—Muhammad debated with God the wisdom of appointing a caliph to lead the Muslims after his death, but God stood by His original decision to have the Muhammad succeeded by male descendants (the Imams).  IAW argued that the hadith must be fabricated because other, better hadith contradicted it, and furthermore debating anything with God would be an act of disobedience.<ref name="DLB2004: 87"/>

*in delaying of the payment of the almsgiving (''[[zakat]]'') tax in cases of dire necessity (such as during a drought),  

*giving unbelievers taken captives in jihad the choice of death or submission to the Muslims via payment of a poll tax on  non-Muslims (''[[jizyah]]'').<ref name="DLB2004: 102"/>

*setting aside one-fifth of the booty obtained during jihad for public welfare activities<ref name="DLB2004: 102"/>

Contrary to the association of IAW’s school of Islam with literalism and  mindless rote memorization, IAW declared `The key of knowledge is questions.`<ref name="DLB2004: 107">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 107</ref> He “insisted on establishing the context of particular verses" of the Quran or hadith “so as to avoid a literal interpretation,” found the emphasis on memorization in the religious sciences to be “problematic”,<ref name="DLB2004: 107-8"/> highlighted the importance of the intent and spirit behind the actions taken rather than the ritualism involved,<ref name="DLB2004: 115">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 115</ref>  and denounced literalist ulama  "for their ignorance,” and “rigidity.”<ref name="DLB2004: 117">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 117</ref>

Another claim of some critics—that IAW was a “blind” follower of jurist [[Ibn Taymiyya]]—is contradicted by the fact that only three of 170 citations in his work ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', refer to the works of Ibn Taymiyya.<ref name="DLB2004: 108">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 108</ref><ref>"When pressed to choose between rulings by [[Ibn Hanbal]] and Ibn Taymiyya", he declined to choose,  "preferring to return directly" to the Quran and Sunnah "to form his own scripturally based opinion." (p.111)</ref>

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider “the opinion of any law school to be binding.”<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 112-3</ref>  He did, however,  follow the Hanbali methodology of extreme conservatism in interpretation of the Sharia.<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3"/>

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab encouraged his followers to turn to the example of Muhammad’s companions (Salafs) rather than the opinions of the law schools. In one case, the law schools were unable to agree on the issue of whether property stolen from Muslims but taken in jihad as booty by other Muslims could be returned to the original owner ''after'' booty had been distributed or only before it had. Using independent reasoning (''ijtihad'') and examining a “strong” hadith<ref>[[Hadith terminology#.E1.B9.A2a.E1.B8.A5.C4.AB.E1.B8.A5|Ṣaḥīḥ]] or [[Hadith terminology#.E1.B8.A4asan|Ḥasan]]</ref> where a slave girl stolen from Muhammad was captured in jihad and returned to him, IAW found that the property could be returned even after distribution of booty.<ref name="DLB2004: 112-3"/>

While Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not believe that women had equal right with men since “certain responsibilities and rights vary according to gender”,<ref name="DLB2004: 127">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 127</ref> he “was actively engaged in the empowerment of women through support of awareness and enforcement of their rights,” and “made it clear that men and women were equal in terms of their responsibilities toward God.”  For example he permitted women to recite the Quran (provide they had proper understanding of it and were properly [[hijab|veiled]]) regardless of whether they were menstruating or not.<ref name="DLB2004: 126-7">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 126-7</ref> Further, he “made it clear” that both genders “were equal in terms of their responsibilities toward God,” by stating that both men and women were required to observe the five pillars of Islam.<ref name="DLB2004: 127"/> But if women living under "contemporary Wahhabi regimes" suffer from what the author calls "apparent oppression", where does it come from?  DeLong-Bas asks if this misogyny "has more to do with patriarchy and local customs" than IAW's teachings.<ref name="DLB2004: 125">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 125</ref>

While he is famous for leading the stoning to death of an adulterous woman early in his career,  DeLong-Bas writes that in fact "His overriding concern was to protect women in the sphere in which they were the most vulnerable -- sexual relations."<ref name="DLB2004: 129">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 129</ref>  His writing "makes it clear that marriage is the only legal means for the satisfaction of sexual desire".<ref name="DLB2004: 131">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 131</ref> The author explains that we know this based on his proclamation that  "any man ... who fornicates with a Muslim woman" whether slave or free  is to be put to death,<ref name="DLB2004: 129"/> and his "elaboration on the topic of sexual relations with slaves and servants.".<ref name="DLB2004: 129"/>

DeLong-Bas states that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab "declared sexual relations with slave women to be forbidden because they occurred outside of marriage."<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/> While he never used the Islamic term for forbidden, "''[[haram]]''",<ref>"...he does not use the word haram..." footnote on page 317</ref> she notes that he did state that "it is preferable (''afdal'')" and "a supererogatory act of worship" (i.e. going beyond what duty requires) for a slave owner "to give it up/withdraw" from sex with any slave girls/women he might own.<ref name="DLB2004: 128">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 128</ref>  He also taught that "it is preferable for" a slave owner to emancipate and marry any slave/servant woman who had bears him a child.<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/>

"In exchange", the husband is responsible for providing his wife "with a dower (''[[mahr]]'') and maintenance, including food, clothing, and shelter, as well as sexual intercourse."<ref name="DLB2004: 134">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 134</ref>

# determination of the spouses-to-be, (this avoids mistakes "such as the confusion of one daughter or sister for another".<ref name="DLB2004: 135">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 135</ref>)

# consent of the spouses-to-be,

# contracting of the marriage by a male guardian (''[[Wali (Islamic legal guardian)|wali]]'') (IAW "taught that any marriage contracted by someone other than the girl/woman's marriage guardian even if it is the woman herself, is not valid and the marriage is void," since "a girl/woman "giving herself in marriage was tantamount to [[harlot]]ry."<ref name="DLB2004: 140">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 140</ref> The guardian should verify that the husband-to-be is a Muslim, mature, honorable, is sexually and intellectually able, and is not a slave.<ref name="DLB2004: 142">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 142</ref> The guardian should be the bride’s father, but in the event the father could not, IAW gives a "[[order of succession]]" of various male relatives.<ref>assignment of guardianship: to the woman's brother, if he was unavailable,  to the paternal grandfather, than to the woman's son, than to the tribe of the brother, "unless it is law/base/despicable",  then to the paternal uncle, followed by his son, then other relatives in paternal relationships, and if there are no male paternal relatives, to male maternal relatives. (p.142)</ref>  

# presence of two reliable/just witnesses, (there must be "two male witness of just and reliable character at the conclusion of the marriage contract." If one or more male witnesses are unavailable, two female witnesses are acceptable as the equivalent of one male witness and may be substituted.)<ref name="DLB2004: 144">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 144</ref>

# equality of status between the man the woman.<ref name="DLB2004: 135"/> (This refers not to the husband and wife having equal status in their marriage but to whether the groom comes from a background of equal social status to the bride.  This is so important that if the guardian "was not aware of the man's lower status prior to the marriage," he can request the marriage be rendered invalid, "regardless of the opinion of the bride".  DeLong-Bas writes that this "reflects his responsibility to ensure that the woman is married to an appropriate man." Because a marriage to "a man of lower social status would lower the woman's status...")<ref name="DLB2004: 145">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 145</ref>{{#tag:ref|One case of a marriage being invalidated due to husband’s status was the August 2005 Saudi court-ordered divorce of a 34-year old mother of two (named Fatima Mansour) from her husband, Mansur, despite the fact that were happily married and her father (now deceased) had approved the marriage. The divorce was initiated by her half-brother using his powers as her male guardian, who alleged that his half-sister's husband was from a tribe of a low status compared to the status of her tribe and that the husband had failed to disclose this when he first asked for Fatima’s hand. Fatima declared her fear of domestic at her brother’s home (sources: <ref>{{cite web|title=SAUDI ARABIA : Fatima A. Fear for Safety|url=http://www.amnesty.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir_articulo&id_article=9976|work=06 February 2007|publisher=Amnesty International, Belgique Francophone|accessdate=23 February 2014}}</ref> {{cite news|last=AL NAFJAN|first=EMAN|title=Saudi Arabia, My Changing Home|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/saudi-arabia-my-changing-home.html?_r=0|newspaper=New York Times |accessdate=23 February 2014|date=June 8, 2012}}), and was sufficiently concerned to spend four years in jail with her one-year-old daughter before the Supreme Judicial Council overturned the decision.(source: {{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=100}})</ref>|group=Note}}

The Hanbali school  granted the woman the "right to stipulate conditions in her marriage contract."<ref name="DLB2004: 146">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 146</ref> For example, the wife may insist that her husband not marry additional wives or take a concubine, on the other hand if she is to be his second (or third or fourth) wife, she may not demand that he divorce his current wife or wives.<ref name="DLB2004: 147">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 147</ref>  The couple "has the right to meet" prior to entering into the marriage contract, and the man has "the right to look at his potential wife". While normally a marriageable woman would only have her face, hands and feet, uncovered,<ref name="DLB2004: 154">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 154</ref> the potential husband is allowed to view the potential wife's "full head, (including hair), and legs/thighs". If the potential wife is not a virgin he is allowed a "more open view".<ref name="DLB2004: 155">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 155</ref>  (While this might sound like "examination of horseflesh" to some", the author states "it is done simply to satisfy "the practical need to determine compatibility of some sort between the future couple."<ref name="DLB2004: 155"/> Furthermore IAW forbade the viewing of the opposite sex on other circumstances, such as the looking at beautiful women by men unless they are related nor married to them, or women looking at male visitors who are not visiting for "the express purpose of seeking to marry them."<ref name="DLB2004: 156">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 156</ref>

Belying "the extremist misogynist he is often made out to be," IAW responded to a picayune question about "some minute details of women's dress"  with a fatwa not spelling out dress regulations, but simply stating "that clothing and maintaining the wife are the responsibility of the husband, and ended the discussion. Thus it is left to the husband, rather than an external party to decide how his wife ought to dress."<ref name="DLB2004: 157-8">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 157-8</ref>

"Men can also be considered ''nushuz'' if they neglect their martial duties." <ref name="DLB2004: 171"/><ref>(Although nothing is said of a woman hitting her husband.)</ref>

"Historically, men have wielded the most power in matters of divorce [talaq] because they are not required to offer a reason for repudiating their wives.<ref name="DLB2004: 171"/>  

In the case of divorce or the death of one of the spouses "generally speaking, IAW asserted the right of the mother to custody of her child. While classical Islamic law changes custody of a boy from mother to father at age of seven and girl at age of puberty, IAW allowed a boy to select his own guardian at age of "maturity" (although he preferred that  girls went to custody of their father).<ref name="DLB2004: 188"/>

Although "many have claimed" that Wahhabis believe in using ''jihad'' to do this, IAW's "writings make it clear"<ref name="DLB2004: 194">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 194</ref> that he believed missionary work or proselytizing (''[[Dawah|da'wah]]''), or winning true "converts to God" was best done<ref name="DLB2004: 194"/> "through discussion and debate rather than violence and killing."<ref name="DLB2004: 198"/>

In ''da'wah'', the convert first declared "absolute monotheism" before going on to the other [[Five Pillars of Islam|pillars of Islam]]. Having become "a true Muslim" who could "enjoy the benefits of membership" in the Muslim community, the proselytizer was then to address whatever complaints "those who claimed to be suffering from injustice" might have. From this we learn (DeLong-Bas tell us) that  while winning converts is "an important first step ... the main goal of expanding the Muslim community is to create a just society."<ref name="DLB2004: 199"/>

It "must always have a religious justification".<ref name="DLB2004: 202">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 202</ref>  Its purpose "is the protection and aggrandizement of the Muslim community as a whole",<ref name="DLB2004: 202"/>  and "to win adherents to Islam".<ref name="DLB2004: 213">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 213</ref>  It is not for "personal gain or glory",<ref name="DLB2004: 202"/> not to take booty.<ref name="DLB2004: 212">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 212</ref>  -- ''Jihad'' is "not intended to be a get-rich-quick scheme."<ref name="DLB2004: 213"/>

Further proof that "the degree of violence" in jihad encouraged by Wahhabis "is not as extreme" as has often been portrayed, is that IAW "specifically used the Arab term" for `fighting` (''qaatala'') rather than `killing` (''qatala'') in talking about jihad.<ref name="DLB2004: 203"/><ref>Although DeLong-Bas notes " ... it may be assumed that some killing is likely to occur during the process of fighting ..." (p.203).</ref>

''Jihad'' "can only be declared by the religious leader (''imam'')",<ref name="DLB2004: 202-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 202-3</ref>  who is also responsible for making sure rules of ''jihad'' are followed, for distributing funds from the treasury (''[[Bayt al-Mal]]''),<ref name="DLB2004: 211">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 211</ref> and concluding truces and treaties with the enemy whereby they acknowledge Muslim jurisdiction and pay ''[[jizyah]]'' tax.<ref name="DLB2004: 211"/>

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab places numerous restrictions on ''jihad''. He requires that the enemy be called to Islam before being attacked. He forbade jihad against non-Muslims who had submitted to ''jizyah'' tax or who have a business relationship with Muslims, the killing of children, elderly, blind or monks (these were to be called to Islam "until they either submit or God causes them to die for their errors in faith"), or women (provided they did not fight Muslims, encourage non-Muslim fighters or engaged in "revile or scold" Muslims/Wahhabis).<ref name="DLB2004: 203-5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 203-5</ref> Jihad could not be waged just because Muslims found "the personal habits or practices of a given group of people ... inappropriate"  (inappropriate practices including the "drinking of date wine (''[[khamr]]'')" or "a desire for power").<ref name="DLB2004: 203"/>

and the portrayal of Wahhabis as participating "in rampant and wanton destruction in the course of their military activities", is "clearly is not sanctioned by the writings of their religious guide."<ref name="DLB2004: 211"/>

Also subject to strict regulations is the dividing of booty taken from the enemy after the jihad.<ref>IAW distinguished between two types of booty.  

the common possession of the whole Muslim society and divided up and distributed by the amir. (p.212)</ref>  

After fighting was done, booty collected, and inspected to make sure none came from non-enemy sources,<ref name="DLB2004: 212-3">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 212-3</ref> It was to be divided, with four fifths of the money and property going to the leader (''[[emir]]'') and the ''mujahidin'',<ref name="DLB2004: 212"/> and the rest reserved for  orphans, the poor, and the `sons of the path`.<ref name="DLB2004: 214"/>

<ref>rewarding "specific individuals who desire special items" is forbidden prior to the division of the booty, as is giving a  portion of the booty to a tribe hired to participate in the jihad. All this ensures "jihad will not become a means of seeking wealth, privilege, or special status." (p.213)</ref>

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab taught that "only "worn and undesirable robes [''thobes'') captured in battle could be worn, only "emaciated" riding animals could be ridden.<ref name="DLB2004: 216"/>  Weapons could be taken from the enemy only "in such a way" that the enemy was not "cast down ... by it."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>

Booty included people, but as mentioned before "IAW was careful to note that the taking of a female captive does not entitle the owner to sexual relations with her ...." <ref>As mentioned above, IAW believed that not having sex with a slave girl/woman was "a supererogatory act of worship"</ref>

"Here again he broke with other law schools in his concern for human dignity and welfare..."<ref name="DLB2004: 215"/>

One restriction some of the non-Muslim (non-Wahhabi) enemy may not have appreciated was on the return of women and children taken captive. Although they had to remain captive/slave and not return home, this captivity provided them "with the opportunity to become Muslims themselves".<ref name="DLB2004: 207"/> If they were sold as slaves it had to be to another Muslim.<ref>"Although the Muslim `owner` technically has the right to sell a slave, IAW insisted that this can only be to another Muslim." (p.208)</ref>

Post-jihad, the conquered non-Muslim "dhimmi" in a "treaty relationship" were  "entitled to remain on their property in exchange" for obedience and paying taxes applied to non-Muslims -- "the land tax (''[[kharaj]]'') and the poll tax (''jizyah'')." IAW "specifically forbade Muslims from overtaxing their subjects,"<ref name="DLB2004: 217">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 217</ref> or from purchasing the subjects land.<ref>this prohibition ensured that "those who were conquered" maintained "their property and enter[ed] into a treaty relationship with the Muslims. Thus, it remains clear that even the aftermath of jihad is not intended to serve as a means of enriching the Muslims; rather it is designed to encourage those whom they have conquered either to submit to Islam or to enter into treaty relationship with the Muslims. This hardly matches the typical historical image of the Wahhabis as bloodthirsty murderers of any and all who disagreed with them." (p.217)</ref>

Revenue from these taxes and from property abandoned by non-believers fleeing ''jihad'' became the collective property of the Muslims, with "no distinctions to be made in terms of combatants versus noncombatants, age, or social or financial status", with the exception of the portion that went "to the leader to be used at his discretion".<ref name="DLB2004: 217"/>

*The status and power of religious leaders of his era were threatened by IAW's preaching that all Muslims had the "right and the responsibility to encounter and study the Quran and hadith." They responded by smearing his teachings as violent and intolerant.<ref name="DLB2004: 243">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 243</ref>

*[[Muhammad bin Saud]]'s son and successor as [[emir]] -- [[Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad]]—departed from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings, adapting a `convert or die` policy towards conquered subjects, "for the express purpose of acquiring wealth and property".<ref name="DLB2004: 245">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 245</ref>  

*Also in the 19th century, Wahhabis adapted the ideology of [[Ibn Taymiyya]], who called for "jihad against anyone who refused to abide by [[Sharia|Islamic law]] or revolted against the true Muslim authorities" on the grounds that such people were not true Muslims.  Wahhabis embraced Ibn Taymiyyah (according to DeLong-Bas) because they badly wanted to evict the [[Sharif]] rulers of the two holy cities in [[Hijaz]], and to rule Mecca and Medina themselves in a more righteous manner.  The sharifs were—according to some contemporary observers—greedy, religiously slack, unjust, and incompetent in protecting hajji pilgrims from bandits,  but were also Muslims, and waging war against other Muslims was forbidden in Islam.  [[Ibn Taymiyya]]'s belief provided a work-around by allowed Wahhabis to declare the Sharifs unbelievers. Wahhabis went on to drive the sharifs from Hijaz and to accept other beliefs of Ibn Taymiyya different from those of IAW, such as  

**a strict division of the world into opposing realms of ''dar al-kufr'' and ''dar al-Islam'';  

**a "far more extremist approach to the questions of violence and killing than did Ibn Abd al-Wahahb";

**looser rules of ''jihad'' (for example, allowing the killing of captives, the launching of jihad against unbelievers as punishment for infractions as slight as not giving to the Muslim whatever the Muslims demands of them); and  

**a passion for martyrdom in ''jihad'' and a preoccupation with the glories awaiting [[Shahid#Death in warfare|martyrs]] (those who die in jihad) in the afterlife.<ref name="DLB2004: 247-50">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 247-50</ref>    Many of these themes—opposed or untouched by IAW—became prominent among Global jihadis and Islamic radicals.  

*20th century Islamist [[Sayyid Qutb]], like Ibn Taymiyya, focused on martyrdom and jihad, adding the theme of the implacable treachery and enmity towards Islam of [[Ma'alim fi al-Tariq#Western and Jewish Conspiracies|Christians and especially Jews]]. In his influential book ''[[Ma'alim fi al-Tariq|Milestones]]'', Qutb preached that jihad, `is not a temporary phase but a permanent war ... Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto.`<ref name=SQ1988:125-26>Qutb, ''Milestones'', 1988, 125-26</ref><ref name="DLB2004: 264">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 264</ref>  ''Milestones'', was embraced not by Wahhabis in particular, but by militant Islamic movements around the globe, including Osama bin Laden.<ref name="DLB2004: 256">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 256</ref>

''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad'', has received positive reviews<ref name=OUP>{{cite web|title=Wahhabi Islam From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Reviews and Awards|url=http://global.oup.com/academic/product/wahhabi-islam-9780195333015?cc=us&lang=en&#|website=Oxford University Press USA|accessdate=4 August 2014}}</ref> from David E. Long in ''Middle East Journal'' (a “monumental work ... a lucid and carefully documented assessment of Wahhabism."<ref name=Long/>),  Sara Powell in ''Washington Report on Middle East Affairs'' ("...a well-regarded, logically constructed, and considered --if perhaps somewhat sympathetic--analysis of Abd al-Wahhab's beliefs"<ref name=Powell>{{cite journal|last1=Powell|first1=Sara|title=Books [Review] Wahhabi Islam|journal=Washington Report on Middle East Affairs|date=May–June 2005|url=http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/274-washington-report-archives-2000-2005/may-june-2005/8513-book-and-video-reviews-wahabi-islam-a-women-in-struggle.html|accessdate=14 August 2014}}</ref>), ''History'' magazine ("a ground-breaking study ... both controversial and informative"<ref name=OUP/>).

Conservative Muslim anti-Wahhabi author [[Stephen Suleyman Schwartz|Steven Schwartz]] has called her an "apologist", criticizing her for among other things, receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia; not including as a source the correspondence of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, "which critics of Wahhabism and other Saudis consider key to understanding him"; and failing to mention the religious and/or governmental background of some Saudi Arabians mentioned in her acknowledgments.<ref name=Schwartz-thank>{{cite web|last1=Schwartz|first1=Stephen|title=Natana DeLong-Bas: American Professor, Wahhabi Apologist|url=http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/natana_delongbas_american_prof.html|website=Real Clear Politics|accessdate=9 June 2014|ref=January 19, 2007|quote=Her book seemed to have been rushed into print with official Saudi support: DeLong-Bas thanked such individuals as Faisal bin Salman, whose status as a Saudi prince she failed to mention; Abd Allah S. al-Uthaymin, son of a notoriously extreme member of the Wahhabi clerical class in the kingdom; and Fahd as-Semmari, director of the King Abd al-Aziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. She also acknowledged the latter foundation for financial support.}}</ref>  

Reviewer [[Michael J. Ybarra]], called the book "often fascinating", and providing "a nuanced discussion of Wahhab's Quranic interpretation", but also complained that she "seems to bend over backward to give Wahhab the benefit of the doubt while dismissing his critics as biased."<ref name=ybarra/> He also notes that DeLong-Bas "doesn't say ... where on earth" the tolerant form of Wahhabism described by her "ever existed",<ref name=Kearney>{{cite news|last1=Kearney|first1=John|title=The real Wahhab.|url=http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2004/08/08/the_real_wahhab?pg=full|accessdate=13 August 2014|publisher=Boston.com|date=August 8, 2004}}</ref> and that "the voice of Wahhab himself is largely absent from this book" because the author rarely quotes him.<ref name=ybarra/>

[[Khaled Abou El Fadl]], professor of law at UCLA who writes frequently on Islamic jurisprudence, expressed sorrow that Oxford University Press had published the book, stating "This doesn't qualify as scholarship -- it falls within the general phenomenon of Saudi apologetics."<ref name=Kearney/>

She has also been criticized for depending  on the chronicles of supporters of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (primarily [[Ibn Bishr]] who is footnoted 45 times) for biographical information on IAW.  Blogger Zubair Qamar compares it to using "Hitler’s admirers" as a source for a biography on the Führer, and describing the admirer's  as "the `most accurate`" sources "because they were among the closest in `proximity` to him."<ref name=zubair>{{cite web|last1=Qamar|first1=Zubair|title=Critical Book Review: Wahhabi Islam (by Natana DeLong-Bas)|url=http://zubairqamar.com/2014/03/08/critical-book-review-wahhabi-islam-by-natana-delong-bas/|website=AGAINST "ISLAMIC" TERRORISM & ISLAMOPHOBIA|accessdate=13 August 2014|ref=March 8, 2014}}</ref>

  | publisher = [[Oxford University Press]], USA

[[Category:2004 books]]

[[Category:Books about Islam]]

[[Category:Wahhabism]]