Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad: Difference between revisions

'''''Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad''''', is a book by academic [[Natana J. DeLong-Bas]], published in 2004 by [[Oxford University Press]]. It is based "on a close study of the 14 volumes" of collected works<ref name=ybarra/> of Wahhabism's founder, [[Ibn Abd al-Wahhab]] and has been called "the first extensive explication of the theology" of [[Wahhabism]].<ref name=ybarra>{{cite news|url=https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB109027620568967848  |title=Books. In the Prophet's Name  [Review] |first=Michael J. |last=Ybarra|publisher=wsj.com|date=July 20, 2004}}</ref> The book "reveals" (according to its author), "a more moderate, sophisticated, and nuanced" interpretation of Islam than the "standard image" of Wahhabism.<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref>

In many dozens of places throughout her book DeLong-Bas contradicts "preconceived notions" and "negative stereotypes"<ref name="DLB2004: 364">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 364</ref><ref>index has a subheading for "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, negative stereotypes of"</ref> of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, contrasting them with his level of expertise -- "a well-trained and widely traveled scholar and jurist";<ref name="DLB2004: 5">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 5</ref> his true beliefs, interests and approach—a devotion "to the concept of social justice”, concern with  "the protection of women and the poor";<ref name="DLB2004: 17">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 17</ref>  preference “to win converts through discussion, debate, and persuasion rather than force”,<ref name="DLB2004: 35">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 35</ref> call for  “fighting and military engagements” in the “struggle against unbelievers (''[[kuffar]]'') and hypocrites (''[[munafiq]]'')“ only as a “last resort” after “education and the call to Islam” had failed.<ref name="DLB2004: 33">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 33</ref>

His enmity towards non-Muslims has also been overstated, DeLong-Bas believes. He did not "divide the world" into Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis.<ref name="DLB2004: 83">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 83</ref> And while he did "at times" make "vehement denunciations" of them, he "never called for their destruction or death“.<ref name="DLB2004: 61">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 61</ref>  "Even in the case of jihad, if Muslims find themselves in need” Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated that “they may enter the territory of non-Muslims tribes that are friendly to them, [to take what they need] though only with the express permission of the imam.”

<ref>(While a hadith does say that Muhammad plans to petition God on behalf of good Muslim monotheists on Judgment Day, the hadith does not say it is permissible to ''ask'' Muhammad for intercession. (p.70))</ref>  

"major" or "grave" sins include:

*Slaughtering an animal in any other name than God’s

*''Shirk''

DeLong-Bas states that "although it is often asserted" that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was "adamantly opposed to Shiism", he only "denounced" some practices of theirs and "never specifically mentioned the Shia by name" except in one treatise where he "targeted only one particular extremist sect, the Rafidah".<ref name="DLB2004: 22">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 22</ref>{{#tag:ref|DeLong-Bas writes on page 22 that "Although it is often asserted that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was adamantly opposed to Shiism, he specifically targeted only one particular extremist sect, the Rafidah in one only treatise.<P> On page 84 she writes that "Historically the Hanbalis were in fact opposed to Shiism. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself found certain beliefs and practices of Shiis to violate the key doctrine of monotheism.|group=Note}}

Another claim of some critics—that IAW was a “blind” follower of jurist [[Ibn Taymiyya]]—is contradicted by the fact that only three of 170 citations in his work ''Kitab al-Tawhid'', refer to the works of Ibn Taymiyya.<ref name="DLB2004: 108">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 108</ref><ref>"When pressed to choose between rulings by [[Ibn Hanbal]] and Ibn Taymiyya", he declined to choose,  "preferring to return directly" to the Quran and Sunnah "to form his own scripturally based opinion." (p.111)</ref>

DeLong-Bas states that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab "declared sexual relations with slave women to be forbidden because they occurred outside of marriage."<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/> While he never used the Islamic term for forbidden, "''[[haram]]''",<ref>"...he does not use the word haram..." footnote on page 317</ref> she notes that he did state that "it is preferable (''afdal'')" and "a supererogatory act of worship" (i.e. going beyond what duty requires) for a slave owner "to give it up/withdraw" from sex with any slave girls/women he might own.<ref name="DLB2004: 128">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 128</ref>  He also taught that "it is preferable for" a slave owner to emancipate and marry any slave/servant woman who had bears him a child.<ref name="DLB2004: 131"/>

# contracting of the marriage by a male guardian (''[[Wali (Islamic legal guardian)|wali]]'') (IAW "taught that any marriage contracted by someone other than the girl/woman's marriage guardian even if it is the woman herself, is not valid and the marriage is void," since "a girl/woman "giving herself in marriage was tantamount to [[harlot]]ry."<ref name="DLB2004: 140">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 140</ref> The guardian should verify that the husband-to-be is a Muslim, mature, honorable, is sexually and intellectually able, and is not a slave.<ref name="DLB2004: 142">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 142</ref> The guardian should be the bride’s father, but in the event the father could not, IAW gives a "[[order of succession]]" of various male relatives.<ref>assignment of guardianship: to the woman's brother, if he was unavailable,  to the paternal grandfather, than to the woman's son, than to the tribe of the brother, "unless it is law/base/despicable",  then to the paternal uncle, followed by his son, then other relatives in paternal relationships, and if there are no male paternal relatives, to male maternal relatives. (p.142)</ref>  

# equality of status between the man the woman.<ref name="DLB2004: 135"/> (This refers not to the husband and wife having equal status in their marriage but to whether the groom comes from a background of equal social status to the bride.  This is so important that if the guardian "was not aware of the man's lower status prior to the marriage," he can request the marriage be rendered invalid, "regardless of the opinion of the bride".  DeLong-Bas writes that this "reflects his responsibility to ensure that the woman is married to an appropriate man." Because a marriage to "a man of lower social status would lower the woman's status...")<ref name="DLB2004: 145">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 145</ref>{{#tag:ref|One case of a marriage being invalidated due to husband’s status was the August 2005 Saudi court-ordered divorce of a 34-year old mother of two (named Fatima Mansour) from her husband, Mansur, despite the fact that were happily married and her father (now deceased) had approved the marriage. The divorce was initiated by her half-brother using his powers as her male guardian, who alleged that his half-sister's husband was from a tribe of a low status compared to the status of her tribe and that the husband had failed to disclose this when he first asked for Fatima’s hand. Fatima declared her fear of domestic at her brother’s home (sources: <ref>{{cite web|title=SAUDI ARABIA : Fatima A. Fear for Safety|url=http://www.amnesty.be/doc/spip.php?page=imprimir_articulo&id_article=9976|work=06 February 2007|publisher=Amnesty International, Belgique Francophone|accessdate=23 February 2014}}</ref> {{cite news|last=AL NAFJAN|first=EMAN|title=Saudi Arabia, My Changing Home|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/saudi-arabia-my-changing-home.html?_r=0|newspaper=New York Times |accessdate=23 February 2014|date=June 8, 2012}}), and was sufficiently concerned to spend four years in jail with her one-year-old daughter before the Supreme Judicial Council overturned the decision.(source: {{cite book|author=House, Karen Elliott|title=On Saudi Arabia : Its People, past, Religion, Fault Lines and Future| publisher=Knopf|year=2012|page=100}})</ref>|group=Note}}

Belying "the extremist misogynist he is often made out to be," IAW responded to a picayune question about "some minute details of women's dress"  with a fatwa not spelling out dress regulations, but simply stating "that clothing and maintaining the wife are the responsibility of the husband, and ended the discussion. Thus it is left to the husband, rather than an external party to decide how his wife ought to dress."<ref name="DLB2004: 157-8">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 157-8</ref>

"Men can also be considered ''nushuz'' if they neglect their martial duties." <ref name="DLB2004: 171"/><ref>(Although nothing is said of a woman hitting her husband.)</ref>

Further proof that "the degree of violence" in jihad encouraged by Wahhabis "is not as extreme" as has often been portrayed, is that IAW "specifically used the Arab term" for `fighting` (''qaatala'') rather than `killing` (''qatala'') in talking about jihad.<ref name="DLB2004: 203"/><ref>Although DeLong-Bas notes " ... it may be assumed that some killing is likely to occur during the process of fighting ..." (p.203).</ref>

Also subject to strict regulations is the dividing of booty taken from the enemy after the jihad.<ref>IAW distinguished between two types of booty.  

the common possession of the whole Muslim society and divided up and distributed by the amir. (p.212)</ref>  

<ref>rewarding "specific individuals who desire special items" is forbidden prior to the division of the booty, as is giving a  portion of the booty to a tribe hired to participate in the jihad. All this ensures "jihad will not become a means of seeking wealth, privilege, or special status." (p.213)</ref>

Booty included people, but as mentioned before "IAW was careful to note that the taking of a female captive does not entitle the owner to sexual relations with her ...." <ref>As mentioned above, IAW believed that not having sex with a slave girl/woman was "a supererogatory act of worship"</ref>

One restriction some of the non-Muslim (non-Wahhabi) enemy may not have appreciated was on the return of women and children taken captive. Although they had to remain captive/slave and not return home, this captivity provided them "with the opportunity to become Muslims themselves".<ref name="DLB2004: 207"/> If they were sold as slaves it had to be to another Muslim.<ref>"Although the Muslim `owner` technically has the right to sell a slave, IAW insisted that this can only be to another Muslim." (p.208)</ref>

Post-jihad, the conquered non-Muslim "dhimmi" in a "treaty relationship" were  "entitled to remain on their property in exchange" for obedience and paying taxes applied to non-Muslims -- "the land tax (''[[kharaj]]'') and the poll tax (''jizyah'')." IAW "specifically forbade Muslims from overtaxing their subjects,"<ref name="DLB2004: 217">[[#DLB2004|DeLong-Bas, ''Wahhabi Islam'', 2004]]: 217</ref> or from purchasing the subjects land.<ref>this prohibition ensured that "those who were conquered" maintained "their property and enter[ed] into a treaty relationship with the Muslims. Thus, it remains clear that even the aftermath of jihad is not intended to serve as a means of enriching the Muslims; rather it is designed to encourage those whom they have conquered either to submit to Islam or to enter into treaty relationship with the Muslims. This hardly matches the typical historical image of the Wahhabis as bloodthirsty murderers of any and all who disagreed with them." (p.217)</ref>